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23 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Planning

1. PROBLEM: This paper is submitted in response to your request that this office make a study of whether an adequate mechanism exists within the Central Intelligence Agency for the purpose of planning the future work of the organization.

2. DISCUSSION: There is no single unit of the Agency at this time charged with the functions of over-all planning for future activities of the CIA.

a. In actuality, the top-level planning body in the Agency exists in the form of your daily meeting with your Deputies, the Inspector General, Chief of Operations, Executive Assistant, and Assistant Director for Current Intelligence. Here problems are discussed, and decisions taken. If further staff work is needed, action is generally referred to a specific Deputy Director with the responsibility resting on him for coordination both within and outside the Agency.

b. The Project Review Committee can be called a planning body from the viewpoint that it will review a plan, program or project and recommend to you to accept or reject the proposal. The great weakness of the PRC system is that considerable work may be done on a project prior to submission only to be rejected on policy, practicality or financial grounds. As a consequence the PRC on occasion finds itself performing a planning as well as a reviewing function.

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c. All other planning in the Agency, except that which may be done by committees, ad hoc or permanent, is done individually in the offices of the Deputy Directors. (Annex I lists planning groups inside CIA.) Some of this planning may actually be done in inter-agency committees with the consequence that the Agency may be discussing advance plans with other agencies before there is top-level intra-CIA planning. (Annex 2 lists inter-agency committees that can affect CIA plans.)

d. One of the structural weakness in the Agency today is the lack of cross-utilization of the considerable expert talent in nearly all fields of major intelligence and operational interest. This cross-utilization should be undertaken only with necessary precautions to insure the compartmentalization required to preserve clandestine and covert operations. But some mechanism should exist within the agency to insure that the best available talent is utilized in developing plans on all subjects. Just as the DD/P Division or Branch Chief [REDACTED] could provide useful advise and guidance to the ONE, OGI, OSI or ORR experts, so too might the latter prove valuable in discussing general principles concerning operations.

e. Coordination, both within CIA and inter-agency, is closely related to planning. As noted in Annex I, the former DD/I constituted the Office of Intelligence Coordination as his planning office. It is felt that OIC is neither properly located, nor properly constituted, to perform Agency planning or, for that matter, coordination. It is wrong for a "line office" to be performing solely staff functions; it places AD/IC in the position of negotiating with his fellow Assistant

Directors and being an ambassador to the DD/P area with the result that OIC is primarily a coordination office. The relation between planning and coordination is even greater with the possibility of CIA's engaging in greater coordination of inter-agency activities.

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f. The need for an over-all planning body in the Agency is demonstrable. The possibility of a personnel ceiling being placed on CIA is an illustration of how the planning staff would operate. Representatives from all components of the Agency would be given the opportunity to register their needs for personnel; the planning staff would prepare the staff study and recommendations for your consideration. Similarly, a reduction in the intelligence functions of the Department of State would be considered by the planning staff in the light of the over-all intelligence picture, and recommendations made as to what functions should be dropped, what CIA should take over, etc. (Annex 3 lists some of the more immediate subjects for planning staff consideration.)

g. In order to insure close and intimate knowledge of Agency problems and to avoid creation of an ivory tower ^{GROUP} divorced from reality, a CIA Planning Board should operate on a panel basis utilizing the experts on the particular subjects under consideration. This will also insure an equal work load on the top officials of the Agency. Its work should be under the direction and guidance of an individual on your immediate staff. It should have a small secretariat to handle the paper work, draft reports, etc.

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3. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Few, if any, matters should ever arise in your daily meeting with your immediate staff that are not thoroughly staffed out by a CIA planning board. Obviously, while each component of the Agency should be required to look as far forward as possible and practical in planning its own activities, the CIA planning board would develop the over-all Agency plan. If, for example, at 4 p.m. this afternoon an indication was received of the possibility of a new Berlin blockade by the Soviets, the CIA planning board would meet immediately and prepare a "crash" plan for the Deputies and your early consideration, including such items as: a review of both overt and clandestine intelligence coverage and whether steps should be taken to augment it; a check of what the Office of Current Intelligence and Office of National Estimates planned to do on the subject; an indication of what material the Office of Research and Reports had on Berlin's ability to withstand a blockade; determination of what [REDACTED] 25X1C warfare action was being taken or contemplated; assurance that 25X1A proper coordination was being accomplished with State, Defense, [REDACTED], National Security Council Senior Staff, etc.

b. PRC should be purely a review function to insure reasonable and proper programs. With a properly constituted planning staff, it should review plans before they are developed into projects--thus insuring policy approval prior to the bulk of the work in preparing the project.

c. Planning on the Deputy, Office, Staff and Divisional level

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Board. A study should be made as to whether the number of planners in the Agency could be reduced.

d. A CIA Planning Board would insure proper cross-utilization of our professional experts on all subjects.

e. The coordination function now performed by OIC should be very closely related to the CIA planning board.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That a CIA Planning Board be created. (Annex 4 suggests the appropriate organizational location for this Board.)

b. That an Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination be appointed, to be selected from an experienced Agency officer, nominated by the DD/I, DD/P and DD/A, and that this officer have two assistants selected from each of the other Deputy's offices so that all three Deputies will be represented.

c. That the present Office of Intelligence Coordination be abolished and its functions transferred to the Assistant to the Director ~~of~~ for Planning and Coordination.

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